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ABSTRACT—Freedom of speech secures cultural democracy as well as 
political democracy. Just as it is important to make state power accountable 
to citizens, it is also important to give people a say over the development of 
forms of cultural power that transcend the state. In a free society, people 
should have the right to participate in the forms of meaning-making that 
shape who they are and that help constitute them as individuals. 
The digital age shows the advantages of a cultural theory over purely 
democracy-based theories. First, the cultural account offers a more 
convincing explanation of why expression that seems to have little to do 
with political self-government enjoys full First Amendment protection. 
Second, democracy-based theories value speech because it legitimates state 
power. But in the digital age, public discourse does not respect national 
borders. Opinions, ideas, and art circulate internationally, and so does 
cultural power. Cultural freedom means that people must be able to 
participate in the circulation of opinions, ideas, and artistic expression 
throughout the world whether or not this legitimates a particular nation 
state. Third, democracy-based theories protect speech because this benefits 
self-government within a single country; hence, their focus is inevitably 
parochial. By contrast, cultural democracy demands that states consider the 
value of global exchanges of ideas and opinions and the health of the global 
system of telecommunications. These issues have become increasingly 
important as nation-states try to regulate and deform Internet architectures 
to further national concerns and bolster national political authority. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Freedom of speech does more than protect democracy; it also 
promotes a democratic culture.1 The First Amendment guarantees the right 
of individuals and groups to participate in culture and to influence each 
other through participating in culture. Thus, the First Amendment not only 
helps to secure political democracy, it also helps to secure cultural 
democracy. 
Most First Amendment theories justify freedom of expression either in 
terms of protecting individual liberty2 or promoting democracy.3 The theory 
of democratic culture grounds freedom of expression in both liberty and 
democracy. 
The right to participate in culture is a civil as well as a political 
freedom. Although this right helps to legitimate political self-governance, it 
transcends that purpose. Cultural democracy, and therefore cultural 
freedom, is a necessary component of a free society, even in countries that 
are not fully democratic or democratic at all. Moreover, a cultural theory of 
free speech offers a much more convincing explanation of why a great deal 
of expression that seems to have little to do with political self-government 
enjoys full First Amendment protection. 
1 See Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital 
Speech and Democratic Culture]; Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 
36 PEPP. L. REV. 427 (2009). 
2 See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). 
3 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE (1960) (consisting in part of the republication of ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 
(1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Robert H. Bork, 
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35 (1971). 
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Political democracy legitimates the political power exercised within a 
nation-state. But cultural democracy, like culture itself, does not conform to 
political boundaries. The ability to participate in culture is the ability to 
participate in the circulation of opinions, ideas, and artistic expression not 
only within a single nation-state, but potentially throughout the world. 
The significance of cultural democracy—and the right to participate in 
culture and to exchange ideas and opinions regardless of borders—has 
become ever more salient and important in the digital age. Protecting the 
global telecommunications networks and the Internet architectures through 
which culture and information flow has become crucial to freedom of 
expression in the twenty-first century. Theories that value freedom of 
speech because it promotes self-government within a single nation-state 
will increasingly prove parochial and inadequate to protect a truly global 
system of communication. 
This Article explains the relationship between the theory of 
democratic culture and more traditional democracy-based theories of the 
First Amendment. It shows the connections between cultural democracy 
and Robert Post’s important idea of public discourse.4 It reinterprets the 
concept of public discourse to show its roots in the idea of cultural 
democracy. Finally, it shows why the theory of democratic culture is 
especially important to the protection of free expression in the digital era. 
I. THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC CULTURE
Although the theory of democratic culture includes the word 
“democratic,” the theory actually arose as a critique of democracy-based 
theories, and in particular, Alexander Meiklejohn’s famous justification of 
freedom of speech. Meiklejohn argued that free speech is constitutionally 
valuable because it produces an informed citizenry that makes democracy 
work better.5 Protecting freedom of speech secures and improves the ability 
of people to govern themselves in politics, as opposed to other aspects of 
their lives. 
4 See Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990) [hereinafter 
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse]; Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual 
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993) [hereinafter Post, 
Meiklejohn’s Mistake]. 
5 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3. Owen Fiss is one of the great modern champions of this 
approach. See OWEN M. FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF 
STATE POWER 13 (1996) (“We allow people to speak so others can vote. Speech allows people to vote 
intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in possession of all the relevant information.”). 
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In previous work, I have argued that this model is inadequate, and that 
its inadequacies have become increasingly obvious in the Internet age.6 
First, Meiklejohn’s approach, like most democracy-based theories of 
free speech, is “politico-centric.”7 It treats culture and cultural products as 
valuable constitutionally to the extent that they might help educate the 
public about political questions and promote discussion of “serious” issues 
of public concern.8 
Second, if culture is constitutionally valuable because it contributes to 
informed political discussion, it follows that some parts of culture will be 
more valuable than others. Meiklejohn’s model tends either to ignore or 
devalue popular culture. It ignores popular culture to the extent that the 
model celebrates and emphasizes examples of culture that have plausible 
connections to the discussion of serious public issues. The model devalues 
popular culture to the extent that popular culture becomes a distraction 
from the task of self-governance by an informed citizenry. The more 
people fixate on American Idol, the less time they have to spend on 
American self-government. 
These tendencies should hardly be surprising. Meiklejohn’s account 
does not treat culture—or speech, for that matter—as inherently valuable; 
nor is culture valuable as an aspect of personal freedom, individual 
deliberation, or individual self-governance. Rather, culture is 
instrumentally valuable to the extent that it assists political self-
governance, by allowing people to understand the issues of the day. This 
instrumental approach makes it hard to justify wide swaths of popular 
culture, and forms of nonverbal or nonrepresentational art like instrumental 
music.9 
As a result, Meiklejohn and his followers have usually chosen one of 
three alternatives. One alternative is simply to exclude nonverbal and 
nonrepresentational art and much of popular culture from constitutional 
protection (unless, of course the state targets art for political reasons). This 
was Robert Bork’s early view.10 
6 See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 1. 
7 J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1985–86 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 
(1993)). 
8 Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 1, at 30. 
9 See Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning Means for the First 
Amendment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1423, 1441–48 (2014); Alan K. Chen, Instrumental Music and the First 
Amendment, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 381, 436–38 (2015); Mark Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 
35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169, 176–78 (2012). 
10 Bork, supra note 3, at 26–28; cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 153–59 (1993) (suggesting that 
nonpolitical art should be relegated to a lower tier of First Amendment protection). 
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Another strategy is to offer strained explanations of why these forms 
of art and popular culture are relevant to democratic politics. As 
Meiklejohn put it, people need to read poetry in order to know how to 
vote.11 Enriching cultural experiences produce an enriched public 
discourse. To include popular culture, then, all one need do is substitute 
Shakira for Shelley. Thus, American Idol teaches people about the 
importance of lobbying, organization, and voting, and many of the songs 
featured on the program touch on themes that might connect to current 
debates about the regulation of human sexuality. But because one can learn 
something about social and political life from engaging in almost every 
activity, the argument begins to prove too much. 
The last, and in my view, the most reasonable approach, is to include 
nonrepresentational and nonverbal art and popular culture because it is 
simply too difficult to draw administrable lines that would separate those 
forms of art and culture that will turn out to be relevant to politics and self-
government from those that will not. We have no idea how culture may be 
appropriated and repurposed in the future; indeed, a characteristic feature 
of cultural expression is its ability to be mixed, altered, reinscribed, and 
repurposed. Just as the Lord works in mysterious ways, so too culture may 
somehow help people engage in political self-governance, even if the 
connections are not immediately apparent. However sensible this solution 
may be, it does not cure the theory’s politico-centrism. 
The third basic problem with Meiklejohn’s theory is that although it 
may have been adequate for a world of mass communication characteristic 
of the mid-twentieth century, it is not well designed for the Internet age. In 
the mid-twentieth century, the modes of mass communication—television 
and radio stations, publishing houses, theaters, and movie production 
studios—were held by relatively few people.12 Most citizens were relegated 
to being an audience for mass communication. First Amendment theorists 
like Jerome Barron developed theories of access to mass media to 
compensate for this fact, but even under Barron’s theory, only certain 
representatives of the community would have access.13 
Meiklejohn’s theory of freedom of speech, in other words, assumes a 
certain political economy of speech production, and it makes a virtue of 
necessity. Because most people will not own radio or television stations, 
11 Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 263 
(“[T]he people do need novels and dramas and paintings and poems, ‘because they will be called upon 
to vote.’”). 
12 See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
1641, 1644–45 (1967). 
13 See id. at 1667–68, 1677–78. 
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free speech theory must focus on the public’s role as an audience. Hence, 
as Meiklejohn once put it, it is not necessary that everyone gets to speak, as 
long as everything worth saying gets said.14 
Accordingly, we must ensure that citizens have access to every type of 
speech that might help them become informed voters. And because 
ownership of mass media is concentrated in the hands of a few, government 
must ensure that those who own mass media serve the end of producing an 
informed citizenry. The connections between Meiklejohn’s approach and 
the public trustee theory of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC15 are 
obvious.16 Although Red Lion is nominally justified in terms of spectrum 
scarcity,17 its account of free expression is Meiklejohnian. Justice White 
pointed out that the goal of broadcast regulation is to serve the public. As 
he explained, “[T]he people as a whole retain . . . their collective right to 
have the [broadcast] medium function consistently with the ends and 
purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.”18 
Meiklejohn could not have said it better himself. 
But by the end of the twentieth century, the political economy of 
communication had changed radically. In the age of the Internet, many of 
the assumptions that grounded Meiklejohn’s model have fallen away. 
Vastly more people can communicate to others: not merely to small groups, 
but to the general public; and not merely within the United States, but 
around the globe. Although traditional mass media still exist, they no 
longer dominate the spread of culture and knowledge as they once did. 
Increasingly twentieth-century forms of mass media compete with, are 
reshaped by, and even depend on a vibrant sphere of public discourse that 
uses digital telecommunications architectures and digital platforms. Now it 
is possible that everyone gets to speak; the problem is no longer scarcity of 
access to mass communications, it is scarcity of human attention.19 
In this world, Meiklejohnians first experience exhilaration, then 
wariness, then grave disappointment. Initially they are exhilarated by the 
heretofore unimaginable possibilities for an informed, educated, and 
politically engaged citizenry. They start to become wary when they notice 
that the vast majority of people are still not paying attention to public 
14 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 26. 
15 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
16 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 42–43 
(1987). 
17 See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400–01. 
18 Id. at 390. 
19 See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 1, at 6. 
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issues.20 And they become gravely disappointed when they realize that 
digital technologies allow people to escape focusing on matters they find 
disagreeable, annoying, or dull. Instead, people are free to spend even more 
of their time on what pleases them—texting with their friends, watching 
pornography, sharing videos, streaming music, and focusing on their 
favorite bands, fashions, photographs of cake recipes, and every other 
conceivable aspect of digital popular culture. Meiklejohn has met LOLcats, 
and he is not amused. 
I developed my model of democratic culture to understand the value 
of free speech in the context of this new political economy of expression.21 
I sought to explain why free speech is valuable in a world of digital media 
and mass participation in which everyone could potentially communicate 
with everyone, not only within a nation-state, but around the world.22 
People’s ability to speak is no longer dependent on or blocked by the 
gatekeepers of twentieth-century mass communication. Quite the contrary: 
many new media companies no longer focus on broadcasting their own 
content. Instead they facilitate, encourage, and even provoke people to 
express themselves. Examples are search engines like Google, which lives 
off of other people’s creation of links and archives; Twitter, which 
broadcasts people’s brief expressions and links; Instagram, which 
encourages people to post pictures online for others to enjoy; YouTube, 
which provides a platform for videos; and above all, Facebook, which 
depends on people sharing links and photos and discussing their lives, 
likes, and dislikes. 
A theory of free expression for the digital age also has to make sense 
of—and value—the explosion of popular appropriation, combination, and 
creativity in popular discussion, art, and culture. Culture, which had often 
taken a backseat to politics in twentieth-century discussions of the 
foundations of the First Amendment, came to the forefront in the early 
twenty-first century. Many of the major legal battles of the first decades of 
the digital age concerned popular appropriation, remixing, and reuse of 
20 For an early version, see MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 87 (attacking commercial radio for 
“corrupt[ing] both our morals and our intelligence”). Similar themes appear in the works of scholars 
influenced by Meiklejohn. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 138–41 (1991) 
(contrasting burdens of education for civic life with pleasantness of entertainment); SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 3, at 84–91 (decrying “low quality” programming that appeals to tastes of uneducated); Owen M. 
Fiss, Essay, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1986) (“From the 
perspective of a free and open debate, the choice between Love Boat and Fantasy Island is trivial.”); 
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987) (contrasting reruns of I Love Lucy 
and MTV with “the information [members of the electorate] need to make free and intelligent choices 
about government policy, the structure of government, or the nature of society”). 
21 See Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
22 See id. at 4–6. 
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culture. They were fought over the relationship between freedom of 
expression and intellectual property.23 
The digital age, in short, features a different arrangement of cultural 
power and production, which, even if not fully egalitarian, is nevertheless 
closer to a cultural democracy, in which a vast number of people can 
participate in the production and alteration of culture. The concept of a 
democratic culture emphasizes: 
(a) individual creativity and expression made possible by the digital
age;
(b) participation in culture, and the ability to appropriate culture and
use it in ever new ways;
(c) new methods of organization for cultural production and sharing of
cultural products; and
(d) the democratization of the means of cultural production, and the
creation of new telecommunications infrastructures and software
tools that have made this democratization of cultural production
possible.
A theory of democratic culture, in short, concerns freedom to engage 
in cultural production as much as democratic self-government. Although I 
have called my approach a theory of democratic culture, the term 
“democratic” refers not to representative government but to cultural 
participation—the freedom and the ability of individuals to participate in 
culture, and especially a digital culture.24 
It follows, then, that a theory of democratic culture straddles the 
traditional division between liberty-based and democracy-based theories of 
freedom of expression. Nothing in this approach discounts or denies the 
importance of political self-government as a ground for freedom of 
expression, or the First Amendment’s role in democratic legitimation. But 
the theory is concerned with more than this; it does not limit speech’s 
constitutional value to legitimating the government of particular nation-
states. 
Like democracy theorists, I believe that freedom of speech concerns 
power—how to regulate it and hold it accountable. But my conception of 
power is more expansive than theirs. The term “democracy” comes from 
23 Id. at 15–17 (describing growing conflict between digital copyright and freedom of speech in the 
early twenty-first century). 
24 Id. at 3–5, 33–34. 
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two Greek words, “demos” meaning people; and “kratos” meaning power.25 
In its most literal sense, democracy means power to the people. 
The central question of democracy is how people can have power in 
their own lives and over their own lives. A responsive state accountable to 
the public is one way to achieve this end, but it is not the only way. There 
are other forms of power that exist beneath, above, and outside the state. 
One can also organize or critique private institutions—religions, 
workplaces, firms, and families—in terms of democratic principles, 
although the way that democracy operates in each case may differ 
depending on the nature of the practice.26 
In particular, culture and public opinion—often embedded in 
influential private institutions—are among the most important forms of 
power. They influence everyone on Earth, no matter what nation-state they 
belong to. By participating in culture, we mutually influence each other and 
shape each other through the circulation of beliefs and opinions and works 
of art. The state draws attention to its power over individuals in countless 
ways, but the power of culture is so great that it may not even be noticeable 
when it is most effective.27 
One reason to protect freedom of expression is to make the power of 
the state accountable to the people who live within it. But another reason is 
to give people a say over the development of the forms of cultural power 
that both undergird and transcend the state. In a free society, even in one 
that is not perfectly democratic in its politics—or even democratic at all—
people should have the right to participate in the forms of meaning-making 
that shape who they are and that help constitute them as individuals. 
This activity of meaning-making through cultural participation, artistic 
expression, and comment, as well as the phenomenon of mutual influence 
through the circulation of opinions, long predated the rise of modern 
democracies. And it continues even in countries that are still not 
democratic. Moreover, in the digital age, cultural participation is not 
confined to national boundaries and it does not respect national boundaries. 
Although cultural participation may be necessary to legitimate power 
within nation-states, it has importance and value that goes well beyond this 
task. 
25 See Democracy, THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
26 See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE (1999) (tracing the potential demands of democracy 
throughout different parts of individuals’ lives). 
27 See J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY 271 (1998) (“Because 
individuals are constituted by [processes of cultural influence], they are continually immersed in forms 
of hermeneutic power without noticing it.”). 
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Freedom of speech rests on multiple constitutional values, not a single 
value. Freedom of speech supports democratic self-government—in more 
than one way, as we will see in a moment. But freedom of speech also 
protects the freedom to participate in culture. And by protecting the right to 
participate in culture, freedom of speech also promotes the growth and 
spread of mores, opinions, values, art, and knowledge. 
Liberty-oriented theories of freedom of speech tend to emphasize 
individual self-expression, maintaining that speech is crucial to individual 
autonomy.28 By contrast, I want to emphasize the potent effects of mutual 
influence on individuals and the importance of cultural power over 
individuals.29 The individual’s autonomy over his or her conscience, belief, 
and expression is the flip side of the individual’s heteronomy with respect 
to cultural power.30 The individual as individual is both the product of 
multiple cultures and a contributor to these cultures. What we call 
autonomy, or thinking for one’s self, is an unpredictable mixture of 
reaction to, assimilation of, and reconceptualization of the cultural forces 
and meanings that surround us and constitute us. 
Cultures of belief and opinion—for they are always plural and 
variegated—have the most serious and pervasive power over us. People 
influence and reshape each other over time by living and participating in 
cultures of belief and opinion, and by operating within networks of cultural 
power and organized knowledge. Moreover, cultures feature powerful 
institutions and practices—like families, educational organizations, science, 
and religion—that produce, alter, and reproduce beliefs and opinions. 
People come to know themselves through their assimilation, alteration, and 
rejection of the cultures they inhabit and that inevitably inhabit them. 
Freedom of speech is about power—cultural power. People have a right to 
participate in the forms of cultural power that reshape and alter them, 
because what is literally at stake is their own selves. 
II. THE IDEA OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE
In previous work on democratic culture, my primary foil was 
Meiklejohn, who states and argues for the democratic values of freedom of 
speech so clearly and powerfully. But Meiklejohn is hardly the last word in 
democracy-based theories of the First Amendment. One of the most 
28 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 2, at 59. 
29 Cf. BALKIN, supra note 27, at 270–72 (explaining how internalized tools of understanding 
exercise power over individuals). 
30 See id. at 279–85. 
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important and sensible modern versions has been developed by my friend 
and colleague Robert Post. 
Post’s democracy-based theory, although opposed to liberty-based 
theories of the First Amendment, has far more affinities with my account 
than Meiklejohn’s model. For example, Post, far more than Meiklejohn, 
emphasizes the ability of individuals to participate in the formation of 
public opinion.31 As a result, his theory connects the constitutional value of 
free speech to self-government in a different way than Meiklejohn’s, as I 
will describe in a moment. 
One of Post’s central theoretical concepts is the idea of “public 
discourse.”32 Public discourse is expression that operates within a public 
sphere of discussion and circulation of ideas and opinions.33 In Post’s 
account, public discourse is a legal category that is based on a sociological 
phenomenon.34 This is characteristic of much of Post’s work, which tries to 
map legal concepts and doctrines onto a sociological account of how 
people speak, use information, and produce knowledge in a democracy.35 
Post is therefore especially attentive to the practical and cultural boundaries 
that separate the public sphere from other uses of speech and 
communication. 
Post’s concept of public discourse, as well as his generally 
sociological approach, should be attractive to anyone who thinks about the 
First Amendment in cultural terms. His concept of public discourse and his 
emphasis on the sociological formation of the public sphere have strong 
connections to my theory of democratic culture. To be sure, Post explains 
the value of public discourse in terms of political democracy. But I will 
argue that the concept also serves the constitutional value of cultural 
democracy. 
Every theory of free speech protection is also a theory of free speech 
regulation. The values that justify a theory of freedom of speech give us a 
sense of its extension; conversely, the same values also give us a sense of 
where the theory does not extend, because the underlying constitutional 
value is not served or otherwise does not apply. 
In Post’s model, the First Amendment protects public discourse 
because it serves important constitutional values; speech that does not serve 
these values, or serves them only in very limited ways, is not public 
31 See Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 4, at 1115–17. 
32 See Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse, supra note 4, at 604–05. 
33 See id. at 629–30, 639–40. 
34 See id. at 633–44. 
35 See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012). 
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discourse and does not receive protection as public discourse, although it 
might be protected because of other constitutional values, for example, the 
production of knowledge and truth, which Post calls the value of 
“democratic competence.”36 
What constitutional value justifies constitutional protection of public 
discourse? Post argues that public discourse serves the value of democratic 
legitimation. He explains that “[p]ublic discourse is comprised of those 
processes of communication that must remain open to the participation of 
citizens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.”37 Public discourse 
has constitutional value because it supports and maintains the democratic 
legitimacy of the state. This makes Post a democracy theorist of the First 
Amendment, but of a very special kind. 
We can understand why this model is distinctive if we ask how public 
discourse supports the democratic legitimacy of the state. There is a very 
familiar and straightforward answer to this question, but it is not Post’s 
answer. Meiklejohn argued that speech had constitutional value because it 
provided information that helped citizens make wise decisions either in 
selecting representatives or in directly participating in political governance. 
In Meiklejohn’s model, free speech has constitutional value because it 
assures the flow of information that is relevant or potentially relevant to the 
democratic governance of a state. This formulation explains Meiklejohn’s 
famous comment that it is not important that everyone shall speak, but that 
everything worth saying be said. The receipt of information to the 
audience, and not speaker autonomy, is constitutionally valuable, because it 
allows the people to govern themselves, either directly through public 
debate and decisionmaking, or indirectly through electing representatives 
and holding them accountable in elections. 
Post gives a very different answer to this question. “[D]emocratic 
legitimacy,” he explains, “depends upon citizens having the warranted 
belief that their government is responsive to their wishes.”38 Therefore 
citizens must have “unrestricted access” to certain forms of communicative 
action and certain types of communicative media “if this belief is to be 
sustained.”39 
What does Post mean by “warranted belief” that government is 
responsive to our wishes? In a democracy, public officials often do not do 
what particular citizens want them to do. Nevertheless, citizens can express 
36 Id. at 33–34. 
37 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 7 (2000). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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themselves to their friends and neighbors, or to perfect strangers, using 
various media of communication. In this way, they help form a sociological 
phenomenon, which is public opinion. Public opinion is by no means 
unitary, and it is constantly changing. Nevertheless, over time, in a well-
functioning democracy, public opinion should affect how politicians and 
other public officials do their jobs. Put another way, in a well-functioning 
democracy, politicians and public officials should respond to public 
opinion and be guided by its influence. 
For a state to be democratically legitimate, therefore, people need to 
have confidence that public officials are responsive to public opinion, if not 
in the short run, then in the long run. They also need to have confidence 
that, if they choose, they can participate in the formation of public opinion 
by expressing themselves through the various media of communication. 
“The possibility of participating in the formation of public opinion,” Post 
explains, “authorizes citizens to imagine themselves as included within the 
process of collective self-determination.”40 
Does the constitutional value of free speech depend on the shifting and 
potentially unreasonable beliefs and expectations of members of the public 
about the legitimacy of their government? Suppose that the public is 
convinced that the state is responsive to them without robust free speech 
protection. Does this make free speech protection superfluous because it no 
longer serves the relevant constitutional value? Conversely, suppose that 
the public is convinced that freedom of speech has no effect on 
government’s responsiveness, because the state is run by self-reproducing 
elites and corporations. Does this make free speech protection superfluous 
because, once again, it no longer serves the relevant constitutional value? 
Post’s answer to these questions is almost certainly no, and this shows 
that his theory, and his concept of legitimacy, is normative and regulative, 
rather than being purely descriptive and sociological. Post believes that free 
speech underwrites democratic legitimacy because it gives people a 
warranted belief that government is responsive to public opinion. 
Conversely, if government limits freedom of speech, it justifies a warranted 
belief that this will undermine democratic legitimacy. 
The emphasis on warranted belief, however, suggests that Post’s 
model of sociological legitimacy is a regulative concept, rather than simply 
tracking the current state of public belief.41 It combines the sociological and 
40 Id. 
41 See Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 
14 CONSTELLATIONS 72, 85 n.14 (2007) (“[A] subjective conviction of self-government is not a 
determinative and preclusive condition . . . . The conviction must withstand scrutiny . . .[;] it must 
always be open to third parties to attempt to convince a citizen that his or her experience of self-
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the normative. The test of democratic legitimacy is whether, within a given 
society, people would have adequate reasons to believe that state power is 
sufficiently responsive to evolving public opinion. At any point in time, 
some members of the public will feel alienated from their government no 
matter what it does, and no matter how well public officials perform; other 
people will simply have unrealistic views about how democracy works. 
Some people have unreasonable expectations or beliefs, and even if there 
are many of them, they do not undermine the kind of legitimacy that Post 
cares about. Conversely, an overly docile public that happily accepted 
considerable censorship and interference with communications media 
would not necessarily legitimate a democratic state, because their beliefs 
might not be warranted.42 
It is important to note the difference between Post’s account of 
democratic legitimation and Meiklejohn’s. For Post, legitimacy comes 
from people’s warranted belief that they are participating in self-
government, even indirectly, because they are able to participate in the 
formation of public opinion. To vary Meiklejohn’s famous dictum, what 
matters is not that everything important gets said, but that everyone has the 
opportunity to speak, that is, to participate in the formation of public 
opinion. It follows that Post’s model is especially interested in removing 
obstacles to participation in public discourse. Even if people don’t 
participate, or participate very much, in electoral politics, what matters is 
that through their everyday interactions with friends and neighbors, through 
government is delusory.”). 
42 In his 2014 book Citizens Divided, Post argues that government might be justified in regulating 
campaign finance because it tracks the very reasons why freedom of speech has constitutional value, 
namely, that regulation would preserve the public’s confidence in the accountability of government to 
public opinion. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 60 (2014). At one point in the argument, Post suggests that “democratic legitimacy 
depends upon actual beliefs about the responsiveness of elected officials to public opinion,” because “a 
people cannot experience the value of self-government unless they believe themselves to be self-
governing.” Id. at 88 (emphasis added). In response, Frank Michelman pointed out that Post cannot 
possibly mean that legitimacy is merely a question of the citizens’ subjective experience of trust in their 
government. Frank Michelman, Legitimacy, Strict Scrutiny, and the Case Against the Supreme Court, in 
POST, supra, at 118–19 (“Construed as a value of experience, democratic legitimation is a matter of the 
subjective beliefs and imaginings of citizens; it comes and goes as belief in it comes and goes.”). In 
addition, Pam Karlan pointed out that measurements of public confidence in government seem to have 
no discernable relationship to how much campaign finance regulation we have, or whether regulation is 
performing well or poorly. Pamela S. Karlan, Citizens Deflected: Electoral Integrity and Political 
Reform, in POST, supra, at 144 (“[L]evels of trust and distrust appear to float independently of what is 
going on with respect to legal regulation of political spending . . . .”). Post’s response was, and must be, 
that fluctuating levels of trust in government by the public do not undermine the constitutionality of 
campaign finance regulation as long the regulation is reasonably designed to secure public trust. Robert 
C. Post, Response, Representative Democracy, in POST, supra, at 160 (comparing the question of public
confidence to fiduciary law and noting that “[t]he law safeguards fiduciary relationships by using the
concept of ‘reasonableness’ to connect subjective individual experience with normalizing
intersubjective expectations”).
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consuming media, and through making choices about what to read, watch, 
hear, say, tweet, and post online, they are helping to create public opinion. 
It is equally important that politicians be responsive to the public’s 
evolving views, understood collectively. 
For Meiklejohn, the connection between freedom of speech and 
democratic legitimacy is much simpler. What is important is that 
information relevant to public issues circulates among the public, so that 
they can make wise political decisions.43 The Constitution mandates that 
government remove obstacles to participation in public discussion so that 
the people can be informed. If necessary, government might have authority 
to take steps to make sure that people are informed and have incentives to 
participate in self-governance. Once again, this connects Meiklejohn’s 
theory to the public trustee model in Red Lion.44 
What I find especially attractive about Post’s model is that he 
emphasizes the role of participation in forming public opinion, and that he 
understands, indeed emphasizes, that what we call “public opinion” is not 
static but constantly mutating, and not unitary but full of multiple and often 
opposed views and ideas.45 Post also rejects Meiklejohn’s notion that the 
First Amendment allows government to structure the agenda of public 
discussion.46 This follows from the fact that public discourse is a 
freewheeling, participatory enterprise, and that public opinion is constantly 
changing both in its content and in its focus. People decide among 
themselves what is interesting and important to them. Although Post wants 
to legitimate political democracy, both of these ideas are characteristic of 
cultural democracy. 
For this reason, I believe that Post’s democracy-based account does 
not go far enough. He argues that public discourse is constitutionally 
valuable because it legitimates political democracy. But protecting people’s 
ability to participate in the circulation of ideas, beliefs, and opinions also 
protects the characteristic activities of cultural democracy. 
Post tells us that “[p]ublic discourse is comprised of those processes of 
communication that must remain open to the participation of citizens if 
democratic legitimacy is to be maintained.”47 But we could also just as 
43 MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 3, at 26. 
44 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
45 See POST, supra note 42, at 36–37 (defining discursive democracy as one in which public 
opinion is “constantly in flux,” and “always in the making”); id. at 49 (“Because discursive democracy 
regards public opinion as constantly evolving, there is never an ‘outcome’ with respect to which each 
affected person can be entitled to equal influence.”). 
46 See Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake, supra note 4, at 1112–14, 1118. 
47 Post, supra note 37, at 7. 
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easily say that public discourse is comprised of those processes of 
communication that must remain open to the public to ensure cultural 
democracy—the ability to participate in the forms of meaning-making and 
mutual influence that constitute us as individuals. Thus, the concept of 
public discourse serves both the constitutional value of political democracy 
and the constitutional value of cultural democracy. 
III. THREE CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION
So far, I’ve argued that the concept of public discourse serves cultural 
democracy as much as political democracy. Post developed the concept of 
public discourse to legitimate state power. But protecting cultural 
democracy is also a way of legitimating state power, just in a different way 
than in Post’s or Meiklejohn’s models. 
There are three different ways that a constitutional freedom might help 
legitimate state power. 
First, the freedom might help the state achieve its constitutional ends 
more effectively. This is Meiklejohn’s answer. Freedom of speech helps 
citizens and their elected representatives make wise decisions. This serves 
the constitutional goal of democracy, because democracy maintains that the 
people should govern themselves; and they can best do this when they are 
well-informed and have a chance to deliberate about the ends and means of 
governance. 
Second, a constitutional freedom might help maintain the legitimacy 
of state power because it prevents people from feeling alienated from their 
government’s decisionmaking and helps them identify the government’s 
decisions as their decisions. This is Post’s answer. Freedom of speech 
allows people to engage in public discourse. Engaging in public discourse 
creates public opinion. Public opinion, in turn, hopes to influence 
government action. The realistic possibility of this influence gives citizens 
a warranted belief that public officials will, in the long run, be responsive 
to their views. 
But there is also a third account of how a constitutional freedom helps 
maintain the legitimacy of state power. Constitutional freedom helps 
legitimate state power because the guarantee of freedom shows proper 
concern and respect for the people who live under the state’s rule and it 
treats them appropriately and fairly by respecting their freedom. This 
theory of legitimacy is well summed up in Ronald Dworkin’s famous 
formulation that in liberal democracies governments should show “equal 
concern and respect” toward their citizens.48 
48 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xii, 181, 272–73, 275 (1977) (describing the 
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These three different accounts of how constitutional guarantees 
sustain democratic legitimacy correspond roughly to three different 
justifications of judicial review in constitutional democracies; that is, these 
justifications not only legitimate democracy, they also legitimate the 
practice of judicial review within a democracy. 
First, judicial review can help democracies function better by 
preventing interference with democratic processes of deliberation, 
organization, mobilization, and representation; these processes allow new 
majorities to displace older ones, and they prevent groups from entrenching 
themselves in power. 
Second, judicial review can protect minority groups by giving them a 
warranted belief that the government will treat them fairly in the political 
process and enable them to influence public opinion so that they can be part 
of tomorrow’s majority coalitions. This prevents government from 
operating as an alien force over their lives over which they have no hope of 
influence or control. 
Third, judicial review can ensure protection of constitutional 
liberties—whether or not connected to democratic processes of deliberation 
and representation—which require the state to treat people subject to the 
state’s power with appropriate concern and respect. 
You may have noticed that these three justifications of judicial review 
correspond roughly to the second, third, and first paragraphs of Justice 
Stone’s famous explanation of the purposes of judicial review in footnote 4 
of United States v. Carolene Products Co.49 This is no accident. Footnote 4 
is not merely—as it is often read—a rough first cut at how to legitimate 
judicial review in the post-New Deal era.50 The theory of footnote 4 also 
concerns the deeper question of how constitutionally protected liberty 
might legitimate an increasingly powerful state, which exercises largely 
unchecked democratic control over traditional civil freedoms of property 
and contract. 
Accordingly, the modern conception of civil rights and civil liberties 
quickly follows the New Deal revolution. And the First Amendment 
guarantees of speech and press become the paradigmatic examples of civil 
freedom. In the 1940s, they are even called “preferred freedoms.”51 One 
right to equal concern and respect as a basic requirement of liberal political theory). 
49 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that judicial review is most likely justified when 
democratic processes are undermined, when prejudice against minorities undercuts democracy, or when 
fundamental constitutional rights are threatened.). 
50 See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 301–04 (1989); Louis Lusky, 
Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1097–99 (1982). 
51 See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (noting “the preferred place given in our 
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can justify these freedoms in terms of each of the three conceptions of 
legitimation I have described. They help make democracy function better, 
they give warranted belief in government’s responsiveness to public 
opinion, and they show appropriate concern and respect for the individual 
freedom and dignity of people living under the state’s rule.52 
Like the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, many 
constitutional civil liberties can be explained in terms of these three 
accounts of legitimation. They produce better decisions by government 
officials, they help people feel that the government is responsive and 
belongs to the people, and they show equal concern and respect for people 
and treat them fairly. 
Consider, as only one example, the Fourth Amendment’s 
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures, and 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws, as 
applied to police misconduct against minority communities. Without these 
constitutional guarantees, democratic legitimacy is undermined in all three 
ways. If the state allows police officers to instill fear in minority 
communities through stops, searches, arrests, and acts of violence, 
governments are likely to make bad decisions about law enforcement and 
about maintaining social order. They are also likely to cause members of 
minority communities to feel increasingly alienated from the state and to 
feel that they are being occupied and harassed by a malign display of state 
power in which they have no say. Finally, police misconduct shows lack of 
equal concern and respect for minorities, violates their practical freedom, 
destroys their peace of mind, places continuous obstacles in the path of 
their lawful pursuits, and in some cases, takes their lives. 
In just the same way, there are three ways that First Amendment 
freedoms legitimate state power. First, freedom of speech informs the 
public and produces better state decisionmaking in the long run. This is 
Meiklejohn’s explanation. Second, freedom of speech allows people to feel 
that the government is responsive to them and is not alien from them. This 
is Post’s explanation. Third, freedom of speech shows appropriate concern 
and respect for people living under the state’s rule. Respecting people’s 
[constitutional] scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic freedoms secured by the First 
Amendment,” and explaining that “[t]hat priority gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not 
permitting dubious intrusions”). 
52 Similarly we can explain judicial protection of First Amendment freedoms in terms of each of 
the three paragraphs of footnote 4 of Carolene Products. The freedoms of speech and press prevent 
antimajoritarian entrenchment; they help minorities combat prejudice and organize politically to form 
parts of future majorities; and the text of the Constitution specifically mentions these guarantees as 
protected civil freedoms. See Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. The classic account of the 
connection between First Amendment freedoms and the protection of minority rights is HARRY 
KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965).  
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ability to participate in culture and to express their values, emotions, 
opinions and ideas, even if these do not concern politics or public issues, 
respects people’s freedom to think and discuss what matters to them. 
Viewed from this perspective, constitutional protection of art, 
including instrumental music, conceptual art, and popular art, is especially 
easy to justify. Art is the most powerful medium of communication about 
our values, emotions, and opinions, because it can appeal immediately to 
people and it can create an emotional, as well as an intellectual, connection 
to others. Protecting freedom to participate in the formation of public 
opinion and to engage in cultural expression legitimates the state in much 
the same way that protecting other important rights—like the right against 
unreasonable searches and seizures—legitimates the state. It is an aspect of 
what it means to live in a free society. 
These three different explanations for how constitutional guarantees 
maintain state legitimacy help explain why democracy theorists of the First 
Amendment have never succeeded in completely excluding liberty-based 
justifications for freedom of speech. No matter how often democracy 
theorists show us that personal liberty, without more, cannot be a sound 
justification for freedom of speech, people continue to press the argument. 
Why is this? It is because civil freedom is also a source of democratic 
legitimation; it simply legitimates state power in a different way. 
Democratic legitimation of state power and civil freedom form what I 
call a nested opposition. Although nominally opposed to each other, each 
depends on the other in complicated and unexpected ways. Guarantees of 
freedom are a central source of legitimacy of state power, especially in 
democracies. Conversely, as I have argued, the freedom of speech, even 
when described in purely libertarian terms, is actually a kind of democratic 
freedom. It is the right of individuals to engage in democratic cultural 
participation and processes of mutual influence. The idea of cultural 
democracy shows how civil freedom partakes in democratic participation 
and how democratic participation depends on civil freedom. 
To be sure, not all freedoms promote democratic legitimacy in the 
same way or to the same degree. Democracy allows for the regulation of 
freedom in the name of the public interest. And, following the New Deal, 
courts reinterpreted several traditional forms of economic freedom—the 
right to own one’s labor, to contract, and to accumulate and use property—
and subjected them to new forms of democratic control. Older forms of 
civil liberty were displaced by newer ones—what people now generally 
call “civil liberties”—as the central objects of judicial protection.53 
53 See generally KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: DISCONTINUITIES IN THE 
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So the challenge for liberty theorists has always been to give an 
account of freedom of speech that explains why it should have special 
constitutional value that traditional economic freedoms do not enjoy. 
Moreover, because many speech acts fall into the realm of economic 
freedom and commercial activity—for example, in making contracts—it 
cannot be the case that speech is protected simply because it involves 
personal freedom. The challenge for liberty-based theorists is to give an 
account of freedom of speech that does not collapse into general freedom 
for each and every act of communication that is an inevitable part of a 
modern commercial society. 
IV. THE JUDGE OF SOCIETY
What makes cultural freedom, in the sense that I am using the term, 
different from every other freedom to act that the Constitution might 
protect? What distinguishes participation in public discourse, for example, 
from market freedoms? We can only answer this question historically and 
sociologically. What makes an activity part of public discourse depends on 
the way that societies have evolved and the social functions that public 
discourse serves. People talk to each other when they make contracts; they 
communicate when they fill out the forms required by laws regulating the 
securities markets. Our judgments of what constitutes and does not 
constitute public discourse cannot rest solely on the fact that one person is 
speaking or communicating with another. Rather, it rests on a social 
characterization of human activity. 
What distinguishes public discourse from other forms of 
communication? The short answer is that public discourse refers to those 
processes of communication that allow public opinion to serve as the judge 
of society. The long answer requires a bit of history. 
Today people understand public opinion as the judge and the guide of 
state authority. Therefore it seems natural (at least for democracy-based 
theorists) to imagine that there is a class of communicative acts that are 
either concerned with or relevant to democratic self-government. But what 
we now regard as natural or obvious is the result of changes in social life 
that began with modernity, and that created a social formation called public 
opinion, and a public sphere in which public opinion circulates. 
Eventually, public opinion and the public sphere became crucial 
ingredients in supporting and authorizing self-government in modern 
democracies. As Jürgen Habermas explained in his famous account of the 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2004) (describing the rise of the modern 
conception of civil liberties). 
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formation of the public sphere, “The public sphere in the political realm 
evolved from the public sphere in the world of letters; through the vehicle 
of public opinion it put the state in touch with society.”54 But when public 
opinion and the public sphere first emerged, there were few nations that 
even resembled modern democracies in Europe. Most states were governed 
by kings and princes. And in many of these countries, political censorship 
was rampant.55 In England, for example, seditious libel was a crime.56 
The formation of public opinion and a public sphere arose first as a 
civil freedom—or what we would call today a civil liberty—rather than as 
a political freedom. The public sphere was not justified in terms of a 
general ability of people to criticize the state, because monarchs and state 
officials often did not take kindly to such criticisms. Political censorship 
was by no means absolute. European states might tolerate some kinds of 
criticisms but not others, and censorship regimes might be inefficient and 
ineffective.57 But the more important point is that public opinion and the 
public sphere did not exist to legitimate democracy originally because there 
were no democracies (in the modern sense) to legitimate. 
Rather, public opinion served as the judge of society, and of the world. 
We still retain this idea today in the slogan “the court of public opinion.” In 
the eighteenth century, philosophers began to theorize this new social 
formation. For Voltaire, for example, public opinion was the opinion of the 
best people, not of the common masses who, Voltaire believed, were coarse 
and uneducated.58 For David Hume—who, as usual, saw much further than 
54 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY 
INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 30–31 (Thomas Burger trans., 1989). 
55 See Hannah Barker & Simon Burrows, Introduction to PRESS, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1760–1820, at 7 (Hannah Barker & Simon Burrows eds., 2004) 
(“Governments and political elites had many ways to restrict the circulation and content of news. 
Licensing regulations, prior censorship and restrictive privileges were widespread practices.”). 
56 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151 (“[B]lasphemous, immoral, treasonable, 
schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by English Law . . . .”); see also generally 
Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of the Press, 
37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 665–73 (1985) (describing various legal options the English Monarchy used for 
censorship); Leonard W. Levy, On the Origins of the Free Press Clause, 32 UCLA L. REV. 177, 182–
85 (1984) (describing doctrine of seditious libel in England); William T. Mayton, Seditious Libel and 
the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 98–108 (1984) (describing 
origins of seditious libel doctrine). 
57 See Hannah Barker & Simon Burrows, supra note 55, at 8 (noting that although European states 
often feared and sought to control the press, “newspapers often enjoyed a greater freedom than other 
legally printed products, partly because old regime governments tended to lack the machinery to 
monitor the newspaper press effectively”). 
58 See IAN DAVIDSON, VOLTAIRE IN EXILE: THE LAST YEARS, 1753–78, at 101 (2004) (noting that 
Voltaire denied that popular opinion was “that of the population at large, which is almost always 
absurd,” but “the collective voice of decent people who think, and who, over time, reach an infallible 
judgment”). 
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his contemporaries—everyone participated in the formation of public 
opinion. Opinion, Hume believed, was the basis of all forms of authority, in 
politics, in law, and in social life generally.59 Without the support of public 
opinion, any form of authority, including monarchies and dictatorships, 
would eventually collapse.60 Regardless of who participated in it, it was 
generally agreed that public opinion acted as a judge of social life. Public 
opinion was analogized to a tribunal in which the affairs of the day would 
be evaluated.61 
In Habermas’s famous account, the public sphere emerged as a 
distinctive sociological formation in monarchical societies, not 
democracies.62 It was public in the sense that it was open to many different 
kinds of people, who shared in using and developing it. It featured a 
circulation of ideas and views that came to be known as public opinion. In 
the early development of the public sphere, people gathered in salons, 
coffeehouses, and other areas to discuss matters of mutual interest.63 These 
included, among other things, commerce, news of business and foreign 
affairs, mores, gossip, and art. The interest in business also brought with it 
an interest in news of events that might affect business, as well as 
interesting stories from abroad.64 Discussion of business, art, and social 
gossip allowed people to engage in a kind of cultural politics. Through the 
everyday practice of stating, repeating, and responding to opinions, people 
expressed their values and judgments about what was happening around 
59 See DAVID HUME, Of the First Principles of Government, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND 
LITERARY 32, 32 (Eugene F. Miller ed., LibertyClassics rev. ed. 1989) (1777) (“It is therefore, on 
opinion only that government is founded; and this maxim extends to the most despotic and most 
military governments, as well as to the most free and most popular.”). 
60 See id. at 32–33. 
61 Jeremy Bentham’s 1791 An Essay on Political Tactics made the comparison in these terms: 
The public compose a tribunal, which is more powerful than all the other tribunals together. 
An individual may pretend to disregard its decrees—to represent them as formed of fluctuating 
and opposite opinions, which destroy one another; but every one feels, that though this tribunal 
may err, it is incorruptible; that it continually tends to become enlightened; that it unites all the 
wisdom and all the justice of the nation; that it always decides the destiny of public men; and that 
the punishments which pronounces are inevitable. Those who complain of its judgments, only 
appeal to itself; and the man of virtue, in resisting the opinion of to-day—in rising above general 
clamour, counts and weighs in secret the suffrages of those who resemble himself. 
Jeremy Bentham, “Of Publicity,” in An Essay on Political Tactics, in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY 
BENTHAM 198, ch. II, § 1, at 310 (John Bowring ed. 1843); see also generally Fred Cutler, Jeremy 
Bentham and the Public Opinion Tribunal, 63 PUB. OPINION Q. 321 (1999) (explaining Bentham’s 
theory of public opinion). 
62 HABERMAS, supra note 54, at 27–28 (noting emergence of public reason within monarchical 
states). 
63 Craig Calhoun, Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC 
SPHERE 1, 8, 12 (Craig Calhoun ed. 1992) 
64 See HABERMAS, supra note 54, at 16 (noting role of commerce in stimulating interest in news of 
distant events). 
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them, including the actions of others in business, in social life, and 
especially in the world of arts and letters. 
Significant political censorship coexisted with discussion of these 
matters.65 A society could have a domain of civil freedom, and a sphere of 
mutual influence which could affect both private actors and state officials, 
but it would not yet be a democracy in the modern sense. The society 
would have, however, a form of cultural democracy, to the extent that there 
was relatively free and open access to an emerging public sphere. 
Cultural democracy thus precedes political democracy both 
ontologically and historically. Even before there was full-fledged 
democracy in our modern sense—with regular elections of representatives, 
general access to the vote, and protections for speech overtly critical of the 
government—there was public discourse, public opinion, gossip, and art. 
The circulation of public discourse about mores, customs, manners, news, 
and art, and the emergence of the sociological phenomenon of public 
opinion as a judge of the social world, precede modern notions of 
representative democracy and democratic legitimacy. These same 
phenomena exist today, both in democratic and nondemocratic nations, as 
the basis of cultural democracy and cultural freedom. 
The same institutions and practices that served as the judge of society, 
however, also allowed people to discuss and criticize the actions of public 
officials and the structure of governance. Voltaire, for example, sought to 
inflame and provoke public opinion (in his sense) against the unjust 
decisions of courts.66 In this way, public opinion, as the judge of the social 
world, naturally developed into the judge of public actors. And because, as 
Hume argued, public opinion was the basis of all social authority, it also, 
inevitably, became the basis of all political authority. Hume’s assessment 
of the power of public opinion was borne out repeatedly in political 
revolutions, including the American Revolution. 
The public sphere and the development of public opinion prepare the 
way for modern democracy, because they create a cultural infrastructure for 
the circulation of public opinions necessary for democracy to thrive and to 
be legitimate. The development of public opinion and a public sphere gave 
rise to media, institutions, and practices adaptable to an emerging form of 
democratic politics. People could use these media, institutions, and 
practices to delegitimize arbitrary and nondemocratic governance and to 
legitimate democratic exercises of political power. The same social 
arrangements, technologies, and institutions that developed to share 
65 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
66 See, e.g., IAN DAVIDSON, VOLTAIRE: A LIFE 367–71 (2010). 
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opinions on diverse subjects could also be harnessed to discuss politics and 
public policy. The growth of rhetorical practices for religious preaching, 
artistic expression, and cultural exchange among the public enabled their 
later development and use in democratic politics. 
But we should not confuse the fact that public opinion prepares the 
way for political democracy, and creates an infrastructure or substrate for 
it, with the very different idea that public discourse is merely a handmaiden 
for political democracy, or that its constitutional value today consists only 
in the fact that it eventually came to support democracy. Public opinion 
does not shed its earlier functions because it takes on new ones. This 
monopolization of the constitutional purpose of the public sphere is the 
error of politico-centrism. It would be like saying that fish have value today 
only because earlier fish evolved into mammals, and mammals have value 
today only because earlier mammals evolved into human beings. 
The public sphere and the circulation of public opinion, as well as the 
freedom to create, discuss, and distribute artistic works, have independent 
value. They are important elements of a free society, and they enable 
people, even in countries that are not fully democratic—or democratic at 
all—to comment on and respond to cultural forces that shape them and 
affect their lives in countless ways. In China, where the state is controlled 
by a single party and there is systematic censorship of political opinions 
criticizing the government, people still use social media to discuss issues of 
culture, mores, ethics, and corruption.67 We should remember, too, that for 
most of its history, the United States itself was not fully democratic by 
contemporary standards, and practiced various forms of political 
censorship;68 yet it maintained an area of civil freedom for public 
discussion. Regardless of the form of government, public opinion may still 
operate as a judge of society and of the world around it. 
V. THE NESTED OPPOSITION OF CULTURAL AND POLITICAL DEMOCRACY
My argument does not discard political democracy as a ground of
freedom of speech in favor of cultural democracy. It does not deny or 
disparage the forms of legitimation that democracy theorists like Post and 
67 See Thomas Crampton, Social Media in China: The Same, but Different, CHINA BUS. REV. 
(Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/social-media-in-china-the-same-but-different/ 
[https://perma.cc/A2P8-MZ99]; Social Media Encouraging Corruption Whistleblowing, CHINA DAILY 
(May 9, 2015, 7:44), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-05/09/content_20665420.htm 
[https://perma.cc/L8ND-4CCT]; Yilu Zuo, The People’s Right to Cultural Construction: A 
Breakthrough of China’s Free Speech (Feb. 2016) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Yale Law School) 
(on file with author). 
68 See generally STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY (2008) (tracing history of free speech protection and suppression in the United States). 
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Meiklejohn have argued for. My point, rather, is to articulate a basic 
constitutional value for freedom of speech that has deep historical and 
conceptual connections to the rise of democratic self-government but is not 
identical to it. Democratic self-governance and cultural freedom form a 
nested opposition. Although nominally opposed, political democracy arises 
out of the conditions made possible by cultural freedom, and cultural 
democracy continues to support political democracy to this day. 
Consider the multiple functions of participation in public discourse 
and in the formation of public opinion in a free society: 
1. Public opinion provides a ground of approval and authority for
behavior, actions, and events. It expresses social judgments.
2. Conversely, public discourse offers a space for challenging accepted
forms of authority and contesting standards of social approval.
3. Public discourse causes shifts in opinions, customs, fashions, mores,
and ways of living. It affects the development of art and business.
4. Public opinion exposes corruption, wrongdoing, and violations of
social norms. It provides a vehicle for satire, parody, and ridicule.
5. Participation in public discourse encourages freedom of thought and
conscience and the development of intellectual and artistic abilities.
6. Participation in public discourse promotes the development of skills
of reasoning, argument, and rhetoric.
7. Participation in public discourse creates audiences for and interest in
artistic and scientific production.
8. Participation in public discourse facilitates the circulation of
information that is valuable for business, religion, community life,
and for individual decisions about the direction and meaning of a
person’s life.
Each of these examples shows the important values served by cultural 
freedom. But it is not difficult to see how each of these examples might 
also be useful to democratic politics, to informed discussion of public 
issues, and to democratic legitimacy. That is hardly surprising; as I have 
argued, cultural freedom supports and enables political freedom, 
throughout history and in the present. Yet one can understand this support 
without engaging in politico-centrism—that is, valuing public discourse 
about commerce, art, and mores solely as a support or adjunct to the role of 
public discourse in legitimating democracy. One does not have to treat 
political discussion as the highest, most valuable, or most characteristic 
form of public discourse, and one does not have to assume that public 
discourse that has little discernable connection to the discussion of public 
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affairs is either exceptional, debased, or a distraction from core examples of 
public discourse. 
Post has made an analogous claim about Meiklejohn’s conception of 
democratic legitimacy. Post argues that the formation of public opinion 
surely assists the right of people to vote and to choose their 
representatives—which is Meiklejohn’s primary concern—but that it is 
valuable in its own right as a source of democratic legitimation. He points 
out that if we only gave people the right to vote but denied them the right to 
discuss public issues among themselves, our democracy would be not very 
democratic at all.69 Even so, Post argues the capacity to participate in public 
opinion does not exist solely for the purpose of an informed public. It has 
independent constitutional significance as a ground of legitimacy. 
We can take Post’s reasoning one step further. If public opinion makes 
electoral democracy more truly democratic, cultural democracy makes both 
opinion-based and electoral conceptions of democracy more truly 
democratic. Just as the public sphere is important to the integrity of the 
right to vote, cultural freedom is important to the integrity of the sphere of 
opinion formation in a democracy. Art, and in particular, popular art, 
allows discussion of mores, values, customs, meanings, and emotions even 
if people do not want to talk about politics or public policy in a narrower 
sense. Without freedom of cultural participation, political democracy 
would be impoverished. 
Cultural democracy underwrites public discourse, and in the process, 
underwrites political freedom. The edifice of political democracy rests on 
the foundations of cultural democracy. But once again, it does not follow 
that cultural democracy has constitutional value merely as a support or 
adjunct of political democracy. The fact that A supports B does not mean 
that A exists for the purpose of supporting B. Although the Earth supports 
highways, the Earth does not exist for the purpose of highway construction, 
any more than the human nose exists to hold glasses. 
Culture operates through forms of power deeper than the state. It is 
exercised in different ways and features different forms of accountability. 
People do not change their culture by having elections about what their 
culture will be like. Nor do they change culture by voting new politicians 
into office. Laws and cultures are mutually constitutive. Yet laws, even 
successful laws, often only alter or reshape features of culture at the 
margins. Cultural change is often far more powerful at altering laws or 
reshaping their understanding and enforcement than changing laws are at 
reshaping culture. 
69 Post, supra note 41, at 74–75. 
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If culture is a deeper form of social power, reproduced through art and 
expression, how do people have a say in what it becomes and how it affects 
them? They have a say through expression, including discussion, cultural 
dissent, and especially through artistic expression. Artistic expression is 
often connected to cultural dissent and the promotion of new cultural 
ideals. One reason is that art is a powerful carrier of emotion, which, in 
turn, is a powerful carrier and shaper of values, mores, and attitudes. 
Cultural democracy gives individuals freedom to participate in the 
forms of mutual influence that constitute various cultures and subcultures 
within a society. Cultures are contested and agonistic as much as they are 
constitutive and regulative. Through cultural participation we get contest, 
evolution, and alteration, as well as conformity and reproduction. 
In a cultural democracy, people can use their freedom of speech to talk 
back to, comment on, parody, appropriate, remix, and alter the cultural 
forms, values, and mores of the world in which they live. In fact, freedom 
of expression may be the only remedy that most people have for living 
within forms of cultural power that they find oppressive or unjust. Freedom 
of speech offers the opportunity, although not the certainty, of reshaping 
culture, which, in turn, reshapes us and others. 
The Earth supports roads, but its expanse is much greater than the 
roads it supports. So it is with cultural and political democracy. When we 
look at how people actually exercise their freedom of expression in 
democracies, the exercise of cultural freedom greatly outstrips the exercise 
of political freedom. Most public discussion is not about politics in the 
narrow sense, or even about broader issues of public policy. It is about 
mores, manners, customs, celebrity, and especially popular art. 
Meiklejohnians may object to the continued dominance of this kind of 
exchange, arguing that it distracts people from focusing on the discussion 
of serious public issues. The irony of this complaint is it that these 
“distractions” supported the development of the public sphere in the first 
place, and made possible the kind of democratic legitimation that 
democracy-based theorists celebrate. Even to this day, cultural expression, 
gossip, and discussion about personal interests, celebrities, and sports 
continue to serve as a substrate for democratic politics, and provide a 
platform for the media of communication that make political discussion 
possible. The public’s desire to discuss matters that have little to do with 
serious public issues have driven the explosion of telecommunications 
infrastructures, new media technologies, and applications. In the digital 
age, culture, and not politics, is the killer app. 
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VI. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE
A theory of free speech protection organized around the constitutional 
value of public discourse neither assumes nor requires that all forms of 
communication are part of public discourse. In fact, a vast amount of 
communication in everyday life is not public discourse and therefore is not 
protected speech.70 For Post, this follows because public discourse is 
closely linked to democratic legitimation. Because I explain the value of 
public discourse in terms of cultural participation as well as democratic 
legitimation, there are likely to be a few differences between our 
approaches. One of them concerns the constitutional treatment of 
commercial speech. 
Post argues that commercial speech is not part of public discourse, 
because it is not designed or intended as a potential contribution to 
democratic legitimation.71 The question is a bit more complicated under a 
theory of cultural democracy. Commercial speech contributes a great deal 
to contemporary culture; in fact, it is difficult to imagine contemporary 
culture without advertising. I agree with Post that we should treat 
commercial speech differently from public discourse, but my reasons are 
somewhat different from his. At the end of the day, however, we both agree 
that what makes commercial speech distinctive—and therefore justifies its 
special constitutional treatment—is not its content, but its social function. 
Post offers three reasons why commercial speech is not a contribution 
to public discourse. First, “we most naturally understand persons who are 
advertising products for sale as seeking to advance their commercial 
interests rather than as participating in the public life of the nation.”72 
Second, commercial advertisers do not “invit[e] reciprocal dialogue or 
discussion.”73 Third, commercial advertisers are not attempting “to make 
the state responsive to them” through advertisements; rather, they are 
“attempting to sell products.”74 For Post, the issue is not the specific 
intentions of commercial advertisers, but the “social significance” of what 
they are doing.75 
My argument, however, has been that public discourse serves a 
constitutional value of freedom of cultural participation beyond merely 
legitimating the democratic exercise of political power. Suppose that I am 
70 See Post, supra note 37, at 20–21. 
71 See id. at 22. 
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correct and that public discourse serves two constitutional values, rather 
than just one. How does this affect Post’s arguments about commercial 
speech? 
Once we look at public discourse from a cultural perspective, several 
of Post’s explanations for why commercial speech is not part of public 
discourse become less compelling. First, there is no clear distinction 
between people “seeking to advance their commercial interests” and 
“participating in the public life of the nation.”76 Many people try to make 
money by contributing to public discourse; conversely, many advertisers 
seek to shape the cultural life of the nation through advancing their 
commercial interests and selling products. The most famous advertising 
campaigns are also contributions to the tropes of public culture, and 
businesspeople like Henry Ford and Steve Jobs famously sought to change 
culture both through selling their goods and through shaping what those 
products meant to the general public. 
Second, Post argues that commercial advertisers do not “invit[e] 
reciprocal dialogue or discussion.”77 But selling goods and services is 
dialogic, not monologic. The best salespeople have always understood that 
they must make a connection to their customers, and that connection comes 
from a cycle of listening and responding to consumer values and interests, 
and reshaping the salesperson’s message accordingly. The successful 
salesperson’s message is designed to explain how the good or service will 
improve a person’s life, often less in terms of efficiency and efficacy than 
in terms of symbolic values or social meanings. It is true that salespeople 
do not enter into a dialogue with their customers willing to be convinced 
that their product is not right for the consumer, but sometimes this actually 
happens, and good salespeople often learn from these encounters. 
Moreover, a speaker’s lack of interest in dialogue generally does not 
remove expression from public discourse; outside of advertising, many 
people engage in public discourse without any interest in changing their 
minds through the give and take of dialogue. 
The digital age has made the dialogic nature of salesmanship even 
more salient. Company websites and the websites of places where goods 
are advertised and sold—like Amazon.com and Walmart.com—invite end-
user comments. Companies attempt to measure consumer response to their 
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Post’s third argument is that the social meaning of commercial 
advertisements is not an attempt “to make the state responsive to” the 
advertiser, but an “attempt[] to sell products.”78 Many, if not most 
contributions to public discourse, however, cannot reasonably be 
understood as an attempt to make the state responsive to us. When we 
engage in art or gossip, when we exchange the latest tricks for engaging in 
our favorite hobbies, or when we decry the lack of piety, idealism, ethics, 
or positive attitudes in the public, or in the world at large, we are not 
necessarily best understood as trying to make the state responsive to us. We 
may even regard the state as irrelevant to our concerns. But we could well 
be understood as trying to affect the culture of the world around us, and in 
that sense we are engaged in public discourse. 
Moreover, what about the commercial advertiser? Isn’t the advertiser 
also trying to reshape the culture to make a better world for selling its 
products? So shouldn’t the social meaning of its expression be 
indistinguishable from the work of the artist or preacher? All three, one 
might argue, are trying to affect culture by participating in culture. 
These and other difficulties emerge when we consider commercial 
speech in light of the definitions of public discourse I’ve offered in this 
Article. First, I said that public discourse is comprised of those processes of 
communication that must remain open to the public to ensure cultural 
democracy—the ability to participate in the forms of meaning-making and 
mutual influence that constitute us as individuals. Later, I added that public 
discourse refers to those processes of communication that allow public 
opinion to serve as the judge of society. 
It should be clear enough that commercial speech is a form of 
meaning-making and influence that attempts to reconstitute individuals as 
consumers. It hopes to make people into the kind of people who will buy 
products, and it hopes to remake their desires into commercial desires. It 
should be equally clear that commercial speech seeks to judge social life. It 
hopes to persuade people that their values can be judged by their purchases 
and possessions. From the standpoint of cultural power and cultural 
influence, commercial speech is clearly an important part of contemporary 
culture. It is one of the most powerful forms of culture circulating in our 
world—as powerful, in its own way, as religion in shaping how people 
understand themselves and their actions. 
But Post makes another point about commercial speech, which, from a 
cultural perspective, is far more relevant in explaining the special status of 
commercial speech in First Amendment doctrine. Post says that the effect 
78 Id. 
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of commercial speech on public opinion is a “by-product” of the attempt to 
sell goods and services.79 The (perhaps unintended) play on words in this 
formulation is revealing. Cultural change is the by-product of the attempt to 
get people to buy products. The social function of the advertisement is the 
attempt to get people to purchase goods and services; the advertisement 
often achieves this goal by intervening in existing culture and changing it 
in a targeted way. Advertising seeks to diagnose its cultural milieu, to alter 
existing culture, and to reshape it in a commercial image. 
Post tells us that commercial speech affects public discourse by 
providing “information”80 that might benefit the public, and it receives 
constitutional protection because it helps circulate information to the 
public.81 But the most important message that advertisers sell is not factual 
information; it is image, emotion, reinterpretations of social norms, and 
assertions of value.82 The most successful advertisers are also among the 
most successful rhetoricians and the most powerful cultural 
reprogrammers. They hope to associate their products with emotions, 
pictures, values, and lifestyles. They seek to connect their products to 
images of fun, friendship, family, success, and sexual attractiveness. In the 
process, advertisers recreate desire in terms of desire for products, value in 
terms of the value of products, and social experience in terms of the social 
experience that comes when one uses the product or replaces an older 
product with a newer one. 
The constitutional justification for treating commercial speech 
differently than speech that is part of public discourse cannot be that 
commercial speech does not concern itself with culture or with public 
opinion—for it often concerns itself with both most directly and 
purposefully. Commercial speech often aims at influencing and reshaping 
both individuals and the cultures in which they live. 
Rather, the constitutional justification for treating commercial speech 
differently is that commercial speech has a special social function; it is an 
attempt to do something through intervening in culture. Commercial speech 
attempts to solicit business, attract customers, and sell goods and services. 
It is an extension of the exercise of market freedoms. Commercial speech 
79 Id. at 13. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 14. Post therefore concludes that “commercial speech doctrine is best explained as resting 
on the constitutional value of democratic competence”—the value of an informed public. POST, supra 
note 35, at 35.  
82 See RONALD K.L. COLLINS & DAVID M. SKOVER, THE DEATH OF DISCOURSE 72–74, 108 (2d ed. 
2005) (arguing that First Amendment doctrine does not reflect the realities of commercial speech 
because, in modern advertising, “image is all”). 
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participates in markets by adapting to and altering the culture in which 
market transactions occur. Instead of simply responding to the forces of 
supply and demand, advertising attempts to alter demand by altering the 
people who have demands, and by altering the culture that constitutes 
people’s understandings of their wants, hopes, and desires. 
When government aims at commercial speech’s distinctive social 
function—by regulating attempts to sell goods and services and to 
influence people to purchase goods and services—government may treat 
commercial speech differently from public discourse. To be sure, if the 
government regulates advertising because of disagreement with its 
ideology or values, it is treating the advertising as a contribution to public 
discourse, not as commercial speech, and courts should apply the same 
rules they apply to regulations of public discourse generally. But this is also 
true whenever government treats conduct or otherwise unprotected speech 
as a contribution to public discourse.83 
The structure of constitutional doctrine reflects the fact that 
commercial speech has a different social function from public discourse. 
Commercial speech doctrine protects the ability of listeners to receive 
information, rather than the autonomy of advertisers to express 
themselves.84 The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he First 
Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the informational 
function of advertising”85 and that “the extension of First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to 
consumers of the information such speech provides.”86 
Thus, First Amendment law does not protect commercial speech to 
vindicate advertisers’ rights to participate in the formation of culture on 
equal terms with everyone else. Instead, the First Amendment protects 
commercial speech because it adds truthful, nonmisleading information that 
might be valuable to people who are participating in public discourse.87 In 
other words, the First Amendment protects advertisers because, as a by-
product of their market behavior, they provide valuable information. 
83 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388–89 (1992) (“[A] State may not prohibit only 
that commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning fashion.”).  
84 Post, supra note 37, at 14–15 (noting that the Supreme Court’s analysis has been “audience 
oriented”); Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 
172 (2015) (noting that the Supreme Court “explicitly created commercial speech doctrine to protect the 
rights of listeners rather than the autonomy of speakers”). 
85 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980). 
86 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985). 
87 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976) 
(noting society’s interest in the “free flow of commercial information” to ensure “intelligent and well 
informed” economic decisions and political opinions about market regulation). 
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If advertising were part of public discourse, these distinctions would 
be unjustified, because the purpose of protecting public discourse is to 
allow people to participate in culture democratically and on equal terms. In 
a cultural democracy, the ability to express one’s self is every bit as 
important as the right to receive and evaluate the expression of others.88 
Moreover, a speaker’s right to participate in public discourse does not turn 
on whether the government thinks that the speaker is providing truthful and 
valuable information to the public. 
One might object: it may be true that current doctrine does not protect 
the autonomy rights of commercial speakers, but perhaps that is because 
the doctrine is wrong. Yet the doctrine’s focus on the rights of audiences 
reflects a deeper logic that helps us understand why advertising is not 
participation in public discourse. 
The First Amendment normally protects public discourse even when it 
is false or misleading. For example, we generally do not prosecute 
politicians for misleading audiences and shading the truth in an attempt to 
win votes.89 (If we did, the jails would be filled to overflowing.) 
Government cannot make it a crime to publish books and articles that deny 
established scientific truths or historical facts. Even false and defamatory 
content receives considerable First Amendment protection.90 
Because commercial speech doctrine is audience-centered, however, 
the rules for false and misleading commercial speech are quite different. 
Commercial speech has constitutional value only because audiences have 
an interest in receiving valuable information. Advertising information is 
valuable to the extent that it is truthful and not misleading. Therefore 
advertisers generally have a right to make truthful and nonmisleading 
claims. But they receive no constitutional protection for false and 
misleading statements,91 and governments may also require advertisers to 
88 As noted previously, Meiklejohn’s theory of free speech is unsatisfying precisely because it 
deemphasizes everyone’s right to express themselves and views speaker autonomy only as a means to 
achieving an informed public. See supra text accompanying notes 13–18. 
89 Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (applying strict scrutiny to strike 
down federal law that criminalized falsely claiming to have been awarded military honors). 
90 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that defamation against 
public officials is protected unless made with actual malice); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that statements of opinion are constitutionally protected and that the 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan privilege applies to defamation against public officials and public 
figures but not to defamation against private figures). 
91 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980) (“[T]here can 
be no constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform 
the public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to 
deceive the public than to inform it.”). 
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alter or supplement their advertisements to inform consumers or to avoid 
misleading them.92 
These differences in treatment go to the heart of why the Constitution 
protects public discourse. In order to protect the equal right to participate in 
culture and in the formation of public opinion, the First Amendment 
forbids paternalistic restrictions on the dissemination of ideas and opinions. 
It presumes that people who engage in public discourse can make up their 
own minds about what to believe. In fact, it is entirely foreseeable that 
many people will be confused, misled, or deceived by what goes on in 
public discourse. But in order to protect the right to participate in public 
discourse, the law treats both speakers and audiences as free, independent, 
and autonomous; it regards them as equally competent and equally able to 
fend for themselves in public discussion, even when this is clearly not the 
case.93 Therefore, even if public discourse misleads or harms people, the 
First Amendment normally protects it.94 
But when people engage in speech that is not characterized as part of 
public discourse, the First Amendment drops these artificial assumptions. It 
allows government to recognize that people are often dependent, 
vulnerable, and not equally able to fend for themselves.95 These 
assumptions apply in the realm of commercial speech, and they provide an 
additional reason to conclude that commercial speech is not part of public 
discourse. Even though advertisers try to persuade people and reshape 
public opinion and public culture, the First Amendment allows 
governments to assume that consumers may not be able to assess market 
information and market risks without compelled disclosures and 
prohibitions on misleading advertisements. If courts applied the usual tests 
92 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“Because the 
extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to 
consumers of the information such speech provides, appellant’s constitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.” (citation omitted)). In 
United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), the Supreme Court held that commercial 
advertisers have rights not to be forced to subsidize certain forms of ideological speech with which they 
disagree, as opposed to speech designed to prevent consumer deception, id. at 416 (“There is no 
suggestion . . . that the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of private persons to pay 
for speech by others are somehow necessary to make voluntary advertisements nonmisleading for 
consumers.”). 
93 See Robert C. Post, Reply to Bender, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 495, 499 (1997) (“False ideas are not 
constitutionally recognized as causing harm within public discourse because persons within that 
discourse are presumed to be autonomous and independent . . . .”). 
94 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 461 (2011) (“As a Nation we have chosen a different 
course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”). 
95 POST, supra note 35, at 23 (“Whereas within public discourse the political imperatives of 
democracy require that persons be regarded as equal and as autonomous, outside public discourse the 
law commonly regards persons as dependent, vulnerable, and hence unequal.” (endnote omitted)). 
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for regulations of public discourse to regulations of commercial speech, 
many, if not most, would not survive the gauntlet of strict scrutiny. 
Nevertheless, although commercial speech is not part of public 
discourse, it receives First Amendment protection that is not afforded to the 
speech involved in making commercial contracts and many other kinds of 
commercial communications.96 The process of making a commercial 
contract is not an attempt to influence society generally, whereas 
commercial speech often sets out to persuade many people to buy goods 
and services. Moreover, as a by-product of its attempt to get people to buy 
products, commercial speech generates knowledge and information. Some 
of this knowledge and information consists of assertions of fact, which 
might be true, false, or misleading, but much advertising appeals to 
emotions and seeks a change in attitudes, values, and social meanings. 
Post calls the knowledge and information that advertising adds a 
contribution to democratic competence, because he argues that it assists 
citizens in political self-government.97 He connects the constitutional value 
of democratic competence to Meiklejohn’s vision of an informed public 
and to Justice White’s theory of broadcasting regulation in Red Lion v. 
FCC.98 In Post’s model, commercial speech has constitutional value 
because it helps inform citizens about how to govern.99 
Nevertheless, “democratic competence” does not seem to be the most 
accurate explanation of the First Amendment value of commercial speech. 
The features and prices of goods and services, and the effects of advertising 
jingles, graphics, narratives, and images may have only the most attenuated 
relationship to the public issues of a democracy. They may, however, alter 
people’s understanding of themselves and their culture, especially when we 
reflect that much advertising is not aimed at conveying facts. It conveys 
values, judgments, and emotions, and it alters and plays off of existing 
cultural values and social understandings. The advertisement for adult 
diapers is about avoiding embarrassment and maintaining autonomy in old 
age; the advertisement for the sports car is about the meaning of 
masculinity, as is the advertisement for drugs to cure erectile dysfunction. 
Therefore, I would say that much commercial speech is better 
described as a contribution to cultural competence. Cultural competence is 
the ability to understand, navigate, and participate in cultural meanings and 
cultural discourse. Advertising contributes to cultural competence because 
96 Post, supra note 37, at 20–21. 
97 POST, supra note 35, at 33–35. 
98 Id. at 35–36, 124 n.36. 
99 Id. at 34–35. 
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it reflects on and reshapes the meaning of social life; it adds images, music, 
narratives, and cultural associations to culture in order to sell products and 
services. No doubt many examples of advertising might be understood as 
contributions to both democratic and cultural competence. But it is likely 
that advertising adds far more to what I call cultural competence than to 
what Post calls democratic competence. The ideas and information that 
may be most valuable to the public may not be facts that assist them in 
governing, but cultural narratives, social meanings, images, and symbols. 
The shift from democratic to cultural competence, however, does not 
affect the permissible grounds of government regulation. Under either 
account, government may require that commercial speech contain truthful 
and nonmisleading information, and it may require advertisers to make 
disclosures about their products that would constitute unconstitutional 
compelled speech if the government demanded them of politicians and 
artists.100  
To be sure, statements of factual information may be the least 
effective features of advertising, which often seeks to convey emotions, 
social judgments, and social meanings. Powerful images, narratives, and 
emotional appeals in advertisements may have significant effects on culture 
and cultural development. But government is much less competent and 
trustworthy in deciding what emotions are true or false, or which social 
meanings are good or bad, than it is in assessing factual questions. 
Therefore commercial speech doctrine appropriately focuses on policing 
what can be proven to be false and misleading. The emotional and cultural 
content of commercial advertising, powerful as it may be, is subject to 
government regulation only to the extent that it helps to mislead, obfuscates 
facts, or manipulates consumers into believing and acting on falsehoods 
and half-truths. 
VII. WHAT CULTURAL DEMOCRACY ADDS TO DEMOCRACY-BASED
THEORIES OF FREE SPEECH 
Why is it important to recognize the constitutional value of cultural 
participation independent from the value of democratic legitimation? What 
does a cultural account of public discourse add to democracy-based 
theories of free speech? The theory of cultural democracy is designed to 
explain how freedom of speech operates in the Internet age. There are three 
reasons why democracy-based theories are insufficient, and each involves 
digital speech in digital networks. The first reason concerns the 
constitutional protection of art and the freedom to engage in artistic 
100 See supra text accompanying notes 91–92. 
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expression in digital media. The second reason concerns the structure of 
global public discourse, which transcends the nation-state. The third reason 
concerns the global nature of the Internet, which can be undermined or 
threatened by national regulation of telecommunications media. 
First, as I noted earlier, a cultural account of public discourse gives a 
much better account of why lots of expression that seems to have little to 
do with popular self-government, including art and instrumental music, 
enjoys full First Amendment protection. That is important because art and 
music, more than politics, have been the battleground of the great legal 
conflicts over digital architectures, which concern the right to use and 
appropriate cultural materials.101 The continuing struggles over intellectual 
property on digital networks have largely concerned the use, appropriation, 
and remixing of popular music, fashion, and popular culture. One result of 
opening up the right to speak to vast numbers of people is the discovery 
that what people most want to talk about, and therefore reappropriate, 
remix, and distribute, has little to do with core political speech and much to 
do with fashion, celebrity gossip, popular music, hobbies, sports, and 
personal news. 
To give only one example of how questions of cultural freedom 
repeatedly arise in the context of policing digital networks, consider the 
recent decision in Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.,102 which resolved an 
important and longstanding issue. The Ninth Circuit decided that copyright 
owners must engage in good faith investigation of whether people who use 
their content online are protected by fair use before they demand that 
online service providers take down videos that remix or reappropriate their 
content.103 This prevents copyright owners from systematically demanding 
suppression of cultural expression by ordinary individuals. The particular 
video at issue was a doting mother’s movie of her young children dancing 
to Prince’s Let’s Go Crazy.104 The ability to make and display such a video 
is central to the idea of cultural democracy, but far less central—perhaps 
even marginal—to political democracy. 
Second, democracy-based theories tether the constitutional value of 
freedom of speech to legitimating state power. But in the age of the 
Internet, public discourse easily overflows national borders. Cultural 
democracy transcends nation-states because culture itself does not respect 
national boundaries. Opinions, ideas, and art circulate internationally. 
101 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004). 
102 801 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2015). 
103 Id. at 1132–33. 
104 Id. at 1129. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1090 
These days, the most important boundaries that segregate 
communication are not national but linguistic. Even linguistic boundaries 
may be porous to the extent that people speak multiple languages and 
appropriate from other languages. Popular art, and especially popular music 
and graphics, can travel freely and influence people around the world even 
when people do not share a common language. 
The cultural account of public discourse therefore harmonizes well 
with Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
speaks in terms of the right “to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”105 A similar 
formulation appears in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights.106 Although the First Amendment need not line up 
perfectly with international conceptions of human rights, in this case the 
cultural account makes better sense of an international perspective on the 
value of freedom of speech. 
It is important not to confuse the argument I am making here—that 
public discourse goes beyond the nation-state and has value beyond 
legitimating nation-states—with a different claim. This is the argument 
that, because of its global reach, the Internet creates a global public sphere 
that is analogous to the public sphere within a nation-state and that 
similarly legitimates international legal norms or international political 
institutions. 
The free flow of public discourse made possible by digital 
technologies has allowed ideas and opinions to circulate internationally in 
ways that would have been far more difficult in the past. Thus, digital 
technologies make possible new global institutions, practices, and forms of 
mutual influence. But one does not need to assume that this has resulted in 
or will inevitably result in a single or unitary global public sphere. 
Merely because of differences in language, it is possible that we may 
never have a unitary global public sphere. Moreover, the circulation of 
ideas and opinions does not correspond to any particular government unit, 
much less to any demos or public who understands itself as living under a 
single government or a single set of laws. Global public discourse does not 
correspond to any particular political configuration.107 
105 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
106 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (recognizing “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other media of his choice.”). 
107 For a discussion of some of the problems of translating Habermas’s idea of the public sphere to 
the international context, see Nancy Fraser, Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy 
and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World, EIPCP (Mar. 2007), 
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If one insists that the terms “public discourse” or “public sphere” must 
be reserved for a discursive phenomenon that legitimates national or 
international political power, then we do not have global public discourse, 
and we do not have a global public sphere, and we will not for a very long 
time. But if public discourse refers to the circulation of ideas and opinions 
globally, then we already have global public discourse, just not one that 
effectively legitimates nation-states or even supra-national entities like the 
European Union. 
To be sure, people are now experimenting with new forms of 
international and transnational organization and legitimation, but these 
efforts are still in their early stages and we do not know how they will 
operate in the long run.108 And it is certainly possible that the circulation of 
global public discourse will eventually underwrite democratic 
decisionmaking at an international or transnational level, analogous to how 
the development of a public sphere eventually paved the way for 
democratic self-government within nation-states. But in the here and now, 
we already have circulation of art, ideas, and opinions around the world. 
The freedom to participate in this circulation of ideas and opinions has 
independent value, regardless of how international political configurations 
eventually turn out. 
Third, a cultural account has consequences for how governments 
design and regulate telecommunications architectures. Global public 
discourse presupposes a certain kind of communications architecture, one 
that facilitates the growth, spread, and circulation of public discourse, not 
merely within the borders of a country, but beyond it. Cultural democracy 
requires that state regulation of communications media must consider the 
value of global exchanges of ideas and opinions and the health of the 
global system of telecommunications as opposed to communications with 
and among members of a single nation-state. 
To be sure, democracy-based theories of free speech may also be 
deeply concerned with how nation-states regulate telecommunications 
architectures to limit discourse from abroad. It follows from Meiklejohn’s 
model, for example, that the public must have free access to ideas and 
opinions from outside the country in order to be well-informed about issues 
of governance; public issues inevitably concern the world beyond the 
nation’s borders. It follows from Post’s model that the public must be able 
to participate in an exchange of ideas and opinions with people in other 
http://eipcp.net/transversal/0605/fraser/en [perma.cc/WME2-69C3]. 
108 See generally NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW (2014) (describing the emerging 
idea and practice of global law). 
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countries in order to develop public opinion within a single nation. If the 
state deliberately restricted information from abroad, this would interfere 
with the processes of communication that produce national public opinion. 
Nevertheless, a state might have reasons to regulate communications 
architectures in ways that do not seriously undermine its democratic 
legitimacy but nevertheless impose burdens on public discourse in other 
countries, and on global public discourse generally. Assuming that people 
within the nation-state still can communicate freely with each other, and 
still have access to information and ideas from abroad, democracy-based 
accounts of free expression might have relatively little to say about these 
forms of regulation. 
Why is this? Democracy-based accounts of free expression worry 
about how freedom of speech might ensure the success or the legitimacy of 
democracy in a single nation-state, not in the world as a whole. 
Democracy-based accounts may value global public discourse, but only 
instrumentally, in terms of how it benefits self-government within a single 
country. Hence their focus is inevitably parochial. 
Working to promote the free flow of information outside the United 
States might assist an informed public in the United States. It might help 
give people within the United States a warranted belief that American 
officials will be responsive to their concerns. But then again, it might not. 
Perhaps more important, the beneficial effects on American public 
discourse gained from forswearing regulation that affects other countries 
might be relatively small. They might be sufficiently small that it makes 
sense for the state to pursue other valuable goals that also promote self-
governance and democratic legitimacy within the United States. 
The structure of digital communications is a global public good. It 
includes universal standards for the transmission of information: a global 
domain name system that makes it possible for people to locate and 
communicate with different sites (like Google.com); servers located 
throughout the world that copy and retransmit content to promote the 
smooth flow of information and avoid bottlenecks; and an international 
network of telecommunications conduits through which information flows. 
The Internet also facilitates the creation of new software platforms (like 
Facebook or YouTube) operating systems (like iOS or Android) and 
applications that allow businesses, civil society organizations, and end-
users to innovate freely as long as they can build on top of the Internet’s 
existing hardware and protocol layers. Finally, the Internet allows for (but 
does not require) systems of secure communications (for example, through 
encryption) that protect privacy and security within nations and across 
borders. 
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Democratic nation-states might want to regulate or alter this structure 
in ways that promote their own authority and legitimacy—including their 
own democratic authority and legitimacy—at the expense of the global 
public good of cultural exchange through the Internet. Here are five 
examples of how this might occur, all of which are happening today: 
1. Countries may be worried about surveillance from other countries,
(For example, European countries are worried about spying by the
United States, and vice versa.) Therefore they might try to
reconfigure telecommunications architecture to try to keep Internet
communications within their country and data storage localized so
that information flows do not cross into other countries where they
might be captured or collected. Even when data localization
succeeds, it can undermine the flow of Internet traffic in other
countries.109
2. Countries might try to alter the global domain name system as it
operates within their country in order to promote national security
and prevent theft of intellectual property. This may undermine the
operation of the domain name system not only in their own country,
but in other countries as well.110
3. Countries might impose obligations on local telecommunications
companies, search engines, and online service providers to filter or
block information that is illegal within their country. Examples are
laws that require infrastructure owners to search for and block
content alleged to violate local intellectual property or privacy
laws.111 (A recent example is the recognition within the European
Union of a “right to be forgotten” directed against and administered
by search engine companies.)112 In the process, countries may make
it more difficult to share and access information, not only for people
109 See Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 680 (2015) (“By 
creating national barriers to data, data localization measures break up the World Wide Web, which was 
designed to share information across the globe.”). 
110 See Mark Lemley, David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don’t Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 34, 34–35 (2011) (discussing the effects of proposed legislation that would allow 
government to alter the domain name system to protect intellectual property rights). 
111 See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 
2309–11 (2014) (discussing the phenomenon of collateral censorship). 
112 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protectión de Datos ¶¶ 88, 99 (May 
13,  2014)  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0
&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=152065&occ=first&dir=&cid=667631 [perma.cc/A6RL-9BRJ] 
(ordering Google to establish procedures for delisting of articles). 
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within the country but also people in other countries to whom the 
country’s laws do not apply.113 
4. Countries might require privately owned telecommunications
companies to assist in government surveillance of people in other
countries and to maintain strict confidentiality about this
cooperation.114
5. Countries might seek to build backdoors into telecommunications
facilities and software encryption programs to facilitate otherwise
lawful foreign intelligence surveillance or criminal investigations.115
A recent example is the FBI’s attempt to require Apple to create
new software tools that will allow law enforcement officials to gain
access to information on Apple iPhones.116 These changes will affect
information security not only within the United States, but in any
place around the globe where Apple’s products are used and sold.117
In other work, I have described these techniques for controlling 
Internet infrastructure as “new-school” speech regulation, as opposed to the 
“old-school” model of direct civil fines, criminal penalties, and prior 
restraints directed against individual speakers.118 Many aspects of “new-
school” speech regulation should offend democracy-based theories of 
freedom of speech. But the theory of democratic culture helps us focus on 
features of “new-school” speech regulation that undermine the global 
public goods of Internet freedom. In democracy-based theories, one has to 
show that a nation’s Internet regulation harms self-government within that 
nation-state. In a theory of cultural democracy, by contrast, one need only 
113 See Balkin, supra note 111, at 2314 (explaining that notice and takedown rules affect people in 
other countries). 
114 See id. at 2329–35 (describing the example of gag orders accompanying national security 
letters). 
115 See David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 42–43, 60, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32 (May 22, 2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session29/Documents/A.HRC.29.32_AEV.
doc [perma.cc/XHB8-7GX2] (criticizing government-mandated backdoors for their effects on freedom 
of speech). 
116 Alina Selyukh & Camila Domonoske, Apple, The FBI and iPhone Encryption: A Look at 
What’s at Stake, NPR (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/02/17/467096705/apple-the-fbi-and-iphone-encryption-a-look-at-whats-at-stake 
[https://perma.cc/8UKU-A9QN]. 
117 Julian Sanchez, This Is the Real Reason Apple Is Fighting the FBI, TIME (Feb. 18, 2016), 
http://time.com/4229601/real-reason-apple-is-fighting-the-fbi/ [https://perma.cc/T9VK-VQBL] (“[I]t’s 
a fight over the future of high-tech surveillance[ and] the trust infrastructure undergirding the global 
software ecosystem . . .”). 
118 Balkin, supra note 111. 
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show that Internet regulation harms the global exchange of information, art, 
opinion, and ideas. 
CONCLUSION 
The point of free speech theory, or indeed, any theory of constitutional 
rights, is to help us better understand our constitutional commitments in 
changing circumstances. In the past thirty years, the political economy of 
speech has been utterly transformed, from systems of mass communication 
in which few can speak, to networks of digital communication in which 
many can participate. Yet free speech theory has changed surprisingly 
little. 
At the same time, some of the most pressing questions of free speech 
theory have changed. They no longer concern communist sedition, dirty 
movies, and civil rights picketing. Instead, they concern attempts by 
governments to control and spy on the infrastructure of digital 
communication, and attempts by private parties to bestow constitutional 
protection on market conduct, and turn the First Amendment into a general-
purpose shield against government regulation. 
Thus, two key problems of free speech today are (1) “new-school” 
speech regulation of digital infrastructures; and (2) the complicated 
relationship between freedom of speech and the regulation of businesses 
which deal, in one way or another, with information production and 
information infrastructures, in fields ranging from food and drug law to 
professional conduct to telecommunications policy to securities regulation. 
In this world, the concepts of democratic culture and public discourse 
may prove especially valuable as intellectual tools. The concept of 
democratic culture helps us understand the “new-school” speech regulation 
of the digital infrastructure. The concept of public discourse helps us 
understand the proper relationship between market activity and First 
Amendment protection. Together, these ideas can help us navigate the free 
speech issues of the present age. 
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